

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

The Influence of the United States in the Processes of Regional Integration in Europe, Latin America and Southeast Asia¹

Letícia Cordeiro Simões², Mario Afonso Lima³, Patricia Nasser Carvalho⁴, Beatriz Thomas Carvalho⁵

Abstract

It's undeniable that the United States has played a role as shaper of the international system, by constructing and proposing international rules and organizations in the past century. As a hegemon, its presence can be felt in economic and security fields, as well as in politics, be on international or regional organisms. The United States has often had an important influence in some regional blocs, sometimes acting as a stepping stone, but at other times as a stumbling block to the integration. What we aim with this paper is to analyze the role of the United States in the constitution and in the definition of objectives and actions of three regional blocs: ASEAN, European Union and MERCOSUR. Our main objective is to demonstrate what kind of influence the United States has had in each process of regional integration, determining whether it acted as a sponsor or as objector, and then comparing the three cases.

Key words: European Union (UE), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Common Market of the South (Mercosur), United States, regional integration.

Resumo

É inegável que, desde o século passado, os Estados Unidos desempenharam um papel de formulador do sistema internacional, através da construção e da formulação de regras e organizações internacionais. Como um hegemon, a sua presença pode ser sentida nos campos econômico, político e de segurança, seja nos organismos internacionais ou regionais. Os Estados Unidos tiveram por diversas vezes uma influência importante na constituição de alguns blocos regionais, às vezes atuando como um trampolim, mas em outras vezes como um obstáculo para a integração. O que pretendemos com este trabalho é analisar o papel dos Estados Unidos na constituição e na definição de objetivos e ações de três blocos regionais: ASEAN, a União Europeia e o MERCOSUL. Nosso principal objetivo é demonstrar que tipo de influência Estados Unidos exerceu em cada um desses processos de integração regional, determinando se ele agiu como um patrocinador ou como opositor e, em seguida, comparando os três casos.

Palavras-chave: União Europeia (UE), Associação de Nações do Leste Asiático (ASEAN), Mercado Comum do Sul (Mercosul), Estados Unidos, Integração Regional.

¹ Article presented at the International Studies Association (ISA) annual convention, 2013, San Francisco - California.

² Master in International Relations at Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ). Researcher at National Institutes of Science and Technology – Public Policies, Strategies and Development (INCT/PPED). Email: leticia.simoese@uol.com.br

³ Master in International Relations at Universidade Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ). Email: marioafonso@uol.com.br

⁴ Master in International Relations at the Universidade Federal Fluminense (UFF). Currently attending a doctoral program in International Political Economy at the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro (UFRJ). Professor at the International Relations Bachelor Program at La Salle-RJ University and research assistant at the Institute of Economic Applied Research (IPEA). Email: patinasser@yahoo.com.br

⁵ Master in International Relations at Rio de Janeiro State University (UERJ). Email: bia_thomaz@hotmail.com.

Recebido em 15/06/2013. Aprovado para Publicação em 01/08/2013.

Introduction

After the end of Second World War and the definitely emergence of the United States as an hegemony in the international system, by proposing, constructing, ruling and arbitrating in international relations, their influence in the development of regional organizations in different parts of the world would not be out of this order. Due to this, almost all the regional organizations developed before, during and after the Cold War were in some extent related to the US influence for geostrategic, economic and political purposes. In this context, the “waves” of regionalism - after the end of the Second World War and after the end of the Cold War – have to do with the United States (US) actions.

The aim of this paper is to analyze the role of the United States in the constitution and in the development process of three blocs located in three different regions: European Union (EU), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Common Market of the South (Mercosur). All of them in some extent, by different means and at a different time of its constitution, suffered American influence. Therefore, we assume that the US has an important role in promoting, supporting those blocs, either politically and/or financially and influencing them in their first steps or during a particular stage and sometimes, or even hindering the continuity of these regional integration processes, mostly because the bloc had reached a higher level of integration that turned each to a US competitor or even because the purposes of the US were not even more in compliance to the regional blocs decisions. In this sense, we intend to point out for which reasons in all the three regional integration processes the US acts in different ways: promoting, supporting or hindering. Once promotion is taken as a deeper action, which means, working actively in favor of an integration scheme, support is understood as aid with interest to establish or maintain the regional integration. Hindering, in turn, is to block or to obstruct in any way the process to be continued. While promotion is here described as a stronger, intense and deeper support to regional integration as a way to raise it to other levels; support is described as an encouragement with less intense and significant financial or political aid, but even so means a backing posture of an actor to help the scheme continuity.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

Hindering has the same meaning of a stumbling bloc, and summarizes a course of action in which an actor seeks to hamper or to influence negatively the evolution of a specific regional integration scheme.

As the EU is widely seen as a pre-eminent player in contemporary institutional regional developments and is the oldest process of regional integration discussed, it's the first regional organization to be analyzed. Once it is a complex regional integration, the phases analyzed included the US promotion before, during and after the Cold War. ASEAN is the second and is an important example of the US support to fulfill their geopolitical strategy during the Cold War, and after serving the American purposes and not fitting U.S. strategy to East Asia anymore, ASEAN started to be targeted of the U.S. hindering. In the end, we will discuss Mercosur, the latter bloc that was developed in the early of 1990's, after the end of the Cold War, that means, without the struggles of the bipolarity and that faced U.S. hindering from the beginning, not only for being a initiative inside Americas, without the U.S. participation, but also to be opposite to Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), a Washington's initiative to the region.

The paper is structured in three main sections concerning each bloc. In the first the historical background is taken, highlighting the main facts. In the second, we emphasized the US financial and/or political support to the bloc – if happened – during its creation and after that and what kind of influence U.S. has exerted and for which purposes. In the third, we discuss what is the US role towards those regional integration schemes: promoter, supporter, hinder or a concert of more than one. In the fourth, we discuss how each regional integration process sees US interests in the past and now.

1. EUROPEAN UNION

1.1. EUROPEAN UNION HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The European integration process towards the constitution of the European Union begun in the first half of the 20th century, in the aftermath of World War II, although some former initiatives to establish the peace in the continent had been launched by statesmen as Aristides Briand (1862-1932), the French Prime Minister, during two decades (1909-1929) and the Nobel Prize

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

winner in 1926 – which launched the movement called “European Union” between the two World Wars – and Winston Churchill (1874-1965), the British Prime Minister, which presented a proposal of the construction of “The United States of Europe” during a Conference at the University of Zurich in 1946. All these initiatives aimed to overcome the deep tensions and the permanent disposal to wars that the European States had been following for centuries, especially since the last decades of the Franco-Prussian Wars of 19th century.

All the initiatives were linked to a general perception in the European Continent that it would be necessary to find a path which would enable the National European States by themselves to get over the poor social, economical, juridical and political conditions towards a deeper approach and interdependence. The sudden end of World War I, with the Germany’s surrender while many of its troops were still deployed abroad, caused a deep feeling of treason from the Germany’s Government. This feeling were deepened by the Versailles Treaty, which, like so many treaties that ended wars earlier, was punitive against Germany, and excluded that State from the coming new order. Germany was punished with the loss of territories and colonies and forced to reduce its army, and navy to a minimum to self-defense, as well as a high tax that was imposed as reparation. That Treaty was the highest expression of the intention to submit the German society and its economy to bad even insuperable conditions.

France – the biggest German’s rival – whose demands were the recoup of its territory – Alsacia and Lorena – given to Germany as reparation of the Franco-Prussian War – due to the economic-strategic importance of the rich mines of coal and steel required to feed its own industries. The two other major players in the international system at that time, USA and Russia, both retreated from the European scene, leaving the UK and France as the two European powers, even though they had been heavily damaged during the War.

Under the conditions imposed in Versailles, in the late 1920’s, Germany faced great difficulties to recover its economy, that added to an internally and growing political instability. But what was painful and difficult in the early years of the postwar period, in a short time became much worse due to the consequences of the 1929 international economic crisis, which imposed more restrictions to Germany. Once this event led to the collapse of many economies in the capitalist world, the consequences led to a suddenly cession of the flows of foreign direct investment from the US to Germany on one hand and of the exports of goods from Germany to the US market on the other hand.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

Despite efforts undertaken and great difficulties to reach a satisfactory solution to all European states, that means, the peace in Europe by agreement between two World Wars, the hegemonic power struggled of capitalism, not only in Europe, but in the international system. In the end of the 1920's the political and ideological values of Fascism, which has dominated Italy since the early years of the 1920s and converged with the ideals of right-wing forces that came to power in Portugal and Spain and also those that led to positions of government supporters of Nazism in the Balkans, including Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, which were, in fact, rooted in the economic crisis, granted, according to most of them, by England.

In fact, the Nazism and Fascism have left huge scar on nationalist movements and allowed a federalist idea to be developed in Europe that united several resistance groups that had fought during the war. These groups formed the federalist movement, which developed a European Union of Federalists, in 1946, with the goal of creating an European constitution, as a part of a greater plan of trying to unite the world. The Federalist movement has reached its peak in the European Congress in 1948, and gained attention of several non-communists parties throughout Europe, and had Winston Churchill as Honorary President, who, as we already mentioned in the beginning, two years earlier had made a speech in Zurich, stating the importance of an alliance between France and Germany in order to the "re-creation of the European Family".

The main policy and decision-makers of the West Europe, taking participation in the Congress, the Chancellors Konrad Adenauer, from Germany, the Italian Prime Minister, Alcide de Gasperi, and Jean Monnet, the French Prime Minister, among others, headed by Winston Churchill, became the iconic cheers of the European integration. The most had discussed proposal to start the integration process was about a federalist Europe or a Europe of National States, even though they were spread in many groups, with different understanding about what should be the most convincing federalist structure for Europe.

That speech of Winston Churchill is seen as a first step towards the European integration⁶, and in the speech, it was clear the British intention of staying out of any design to unite Europe, acting as a "friends and sponsors" of this endeavor. A few years later, France Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, came with a plan to begin European integration and in 1951, when the

⁶DEBLOCK, Christian. Hamel, Buno. Bretton Woods et l'ordre économique international d'après-guerre. Un document produit en version numérique par Jean-Marie Tremblay, bénévole, http://www.uqac.quebec.ca/zone30/Classiques_des_sciences_sociales/index.html

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

European Steel and Coal Community (ESCS) was established, the first step to the deepest integration scheme that that we have up until now. The Treaty of Paris, which established the ESCS, was the result of an ingenious work of Jean Monnet, and as the starting point, the Schuman Declaration⁷, presented in May 1950, had already the elements of the Treaty's content. The German coal and the French iron became axis that made possible other European States to join ESCS: Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg.

No longer in the centre of international relations, for the first time in centuries due to the harsh consequences of the World War, Europe had to find new paths to reduce its power loss to a minimum. The way devised for this was a union of the European countries. The current situation of Europe, suggested that any attempt to reconstruct and integrate Europe, had to come from Great Britain (BACHE, 2011), but they were too entangled in its own economic and military reconstruction. Furthermore, Great Britain was not prompt to relinquish its sovereignty of making its own sovereign choices. The first step to this alliance was to unite France and Germany, binding them in a way that would allow nurturing a common trust.

But even in the end of II World War, Western Allies had already realized that a new range of tensions were emerging in the Centre of Europe, once the communism as an economic, political and social order led by the Soviet Union, was spread in Eastern Europe after the Russian Revolution. Moreover, the Soviet Union had a great capacity to recover after the end of the War, what was seen as a threat by the US. The opposition between the capitalist and the order established in the Eastern Europe, the communism, was a turning point to the position of the US in Europe.

This was of great significance to the role of the US in the European Continent from then on as a promoter of capitalism in the range of the Cold War. What was at stake for the US government was the ability of capitalism as an economic order to contain the spread of communist ideas coming from East. The greatest enemy should be contained and this required an urgent action. Moreover, for US government it was clear that concerning British interests, there would never be taken approaches, convergences or joint decision with the Europeans.

⁷ <http://www.eppgroup.eu/Activities/docs/divers/schuman-en.pdf>

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

Kennedy (1989)⁸ states that after the end of the World War I, Europe remained as the centre of the international system, even though in a artificial way, and with series of fights between rival ethnical groups, seeking to establish new states, the civil war in Russia, as well as a destabilization in the centre of the continent, Europe found itself in chaos. This scenario, allied with the fact that the US didn't come forward to its role as hegemony, created a path to a new war, and after a short period of time Europe found itself emerged in another war. The World War II left in its wake a greater destruction in the European continent and assured the hegemonic position swap, from UK to USA, changing once again the geopolitical board, confirming the rise of two superpowers. Kennedy states that the master lines of the new order were being planned even before the combats were finished and polarizing at non-European countries.

The swap of the hegemonic State in the international system after the end of the II World War was also pointed by many theorists working on hegemony and capitalist cycle's debate. Kindleberger (1973:28)⁹ argues that "the international economic and monetary system needs leadership, a country which is prepared, consciously or unconsciously, under some system of rules that it has internalized, to set standards of conduct for other countries ; and to seek to get others to follow them, to take on an undue share of the burdens of the system." Britain had this role from 1815 to 1913, and the United States after 1945, according to Kindleberger, but in the interwar years Britain was unable, and the United States was unwilling, to accept this leadership role; Kindleberger sees in this lack of leadership the main causes for the severity of the depression of the 1930s¹⁰.

Deblock & Hamel (1994: 8) discusses the pos-II World War period, focusing on the US hegemony after the Bretton Woods Conference, arguing that there are many nuances regarding what can be seen for the first sight as an imposed hegemonic order called the *Pax Americana*. In the post war order we should look to the US and its plans in the light of other countries, especially taking into account the role of Great Britain and the Soviet Union, without whom this order would never had happened.

The US, which started taking part directly in the Second World War conflict in the end of 1941, knew the divergences of the Europeans regarding the best way of solving problems in Europe.

⁸ KENNEDY, Paul. **Rise and Decline of the Great Powers**. Fontana Press, London, 1989.

⁹ KINDLEBERGER, Charles. **The World in Depression 1929-1939**, University of California Press, 1986.

¹⁰ GOLDSTEIN, Joshua. **Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age**, Princenton, Princenton University Press, 1986.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

In the end of the War the borders were well established: the final resolution about the borders of the East and West Europe was set: Germany was occupied by the Western Allied Forces – US, United Kingdom and France – considered part of West, while the Soviet Union and its allies were excluded, forming what was known as the East Bloc.

The European Recovery Program, most known as the Marshall Plan, which was announced a year before the Congress of Europe by the American President, Harry Truman, linked to Jean Monnet's, whose ideas were taken for granted. Indeed, the *United States of Europe*, proposed by Monnet, as a federalist proposal, was aligned to the terms of the US Constitution. The proposals of supporting the European integration that could be accepted by the US involved necessarily the communism-capitalist and the German-French rivalries overcoming, two big deals and challenges. Among many initiatives of political groups and social organizations engaged on working on the recovery of the economic and social order for Europe after the Congress of Europe, the most important was the creation of the Organization for Economic European Cooperation (OEEC) in 1948, role was to manage the resources of the Marshall Plan (1947).

The European integration quickly deepened and shortly the ESCS became part of the European Communities, created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome, which established the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). A few years later the European Communities had their first chance to expand their membership. UK, Ireland, Denmark and Norway applied as members, but they were denied by France, whose President, Charles De Gaulle, feared the British entry could mean a deepening influence from Washington. In the following decades, the European Communities increased the number of members and deepened their integration. By the year of 1992, by the signature of the Maastricht Treaty, the European Communities became formally known as European Union (EU), and it has gone from six members to 27, soon to be 28 members, and with broader responsibilities, subject themes and power.

The 1990's and 2000's marked the deepness that the European integration has reached. It has launched a single currency, the Euro, has settled the Schengen Area, and created several supranational institutions with the objective to seek the political cooperation of member states.

1.2. US POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO EUROPEAN UNION

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

As the tensions between USA and Soviet Union escalate, the Cold War had begun to install, rising the strains in Europe. The European integration schemes prior to World War II was previewed to stretch as far as to the boarders of Soviet Union, however, as the relationship with Soviet Union were deteriorating, it became clear that any integration would be limited to the western part of Europe. Layne (2006)¹¹ states that, the US strategy for the European continent was prior to the Soviet Union threat. But nevertheless the threat should not be discarded. There was a civil war in Greece, where communists controlled a great territorial extension, with the support of Soviet Union. This only made clearer the rivalry between USSR and UK, considering the fact that Greece was part of Britain's influence sphere.

The years of 1946-47, especially during the severe winter, had a huge negative impact in the European economic recovery. By the beginning of 1947, the British government declared to Washington, that it could no longer provide support, financially or militarily, to Greece or Turkey. As a result, US President, Henry Truman, asked to the American congress US\$ 400 million as military and financial aid to Greeks and Turks, highlighting the American duty of aiding the free people resisting to the rule of armed minorities and external pressures. This aid has come to known as the Truman Doctrine, where finally the US shown a will to interfere in European matters and bringing to an end its policy of detachment, similarly to what had happened in the end of WWI.

Aldrich (1997, p. 184)¹² points that under both Truman and Eisenhower (American President from 1953-1961), US policymakers conceived of European unification not only as an important end in itself, but also as a way to solve the German problem. Moreover, Aldrich argues that the discrete injection of over three million dollars between 1949 and 1960, mostly from US government sources, was central to efforts to drum up mass support for the Schuman Plan, the European Defense Community - vetted by the National French Assembly in 1954 - and a European Assembly with sovereign powers. This covert contribution never formed less than half the European Movement's budget and, after 1952, probably two-thirds. Simultaneously they sought to undermine the staunch resistance of the British Labour government to

¹¹LAYNE, Christopher. **The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present**. New York, Cornell University Press, 2006.

¹² ALDRICH, Richard J. **CIA and European unity: The American committee on United Europe**. http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/aldrich/publications/oss_cia_united_europe_eec_eu.pdf

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

federalist ideas. One of the most interesting US covert operations in postwar Europe was the funding of the European Movement (ALDRICH, 1997).

During this period the US had its foreign policy was guided a Grand Strategy Logic of the Open Door, in which rested on the fundamental premise “that America’s postwar prosperity was linked to Western Europe’s economic revival” (LAYNE, 2006). Layne states that, in order to achieve this goal, US policy makers would try to replace the European pre-wars national division of national markets, by a single and unified single market, and by unifying the economy into a single European economy, this would be more efficient, or so was believed by US officials. This policy had a pragmatic side, by supporting the economic recovery and promoting a political stability, by the prevention of the rise of communist parties to power, due to a fear that if such parties rise to power, they could promote a nationalist economic policy, threatening US goals.

The US understood the Germany recovery as a necessary step to the recovery of the whole Europe, and to lead these recoveries, the US counted with The UK. However, the UK already had shown clear signs that it would seek nothing more than intergovernmental cooperation, in order to aid on the European recovery. France’s policymakers had a high concern for reducing the German threat by reducing “Germany’s relative power advantage over France” and diminish German independence (LAYNE, 2006), understanding that only by keeping Germany on a “leash”, France could have security once again. This goal was quite different from the established by US policymakers, which understood Germany’s rehabilitation as vital. French policy was a double sided coin, in which on side was French economic strengthening and on the other side, Germany weakening.

To achieve this, France devised a plan – called Monnet Plan – in which tended to reconstruct French industries and economic revival, making France the “economical and political hub of the European system” (LAYNE, 2006), The Monnet Plan also was schemed in order to France surpass Germany as the greatest steel producer and cripple German industries. The French and the American plan for European recovery were divergent and soon the US started to influence France policymakers in order to compel with the American plan.

In 1947, US Secretary of State, George Marshall, announced an aid plan to Europe, which wasn’t seen favorably by USSR that preferred not to take part in it. The Soviet denial in taking part of the plan, made possible to Marshall the argument that his plan and even the Truman Doctrine

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

were part of a reply to the communist threat. Indeed in US the Marshall Plan was supported in the US lobbies which believed in a rapid than a gradual approach to Western Integration. The US requested that the funds distribution was made jointly by European states, and in order to perform this division, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was created. This organization had the goal of macroeconomic co-operation and co-ordination.

The US wouldn't make the same mistake of sitting out of the new world order as it has done at the end of WWI, so the US took lead on the creation e restructuration of organizations that would shape the forthcoming world order. The creation of the United Nations (1945) and the Bretton Woods Institutions (Conference of Bretton Woods, 1944) had a great support from the US, which had already shown signs of its will and capacity to lead the Western world.

Even before the Marshall Plan, the US had lend US\$ 650 million to aid in, and other financial help to boost French recovery. These negotiations to this package was concluded and announced on the eve of France national election, in a clear attempt to influence the outcome in favor of non-communists and the centre-left parties. The Marshall Plan was a shift in the US policy towards Germany, changing how the US saw the cooperation with the soviet administrators in Germany. This change was marked by the perception that Germany should be divided and its western share should be integrated with Western Europe.

The Creation of Federative Republic of Germany was a part of the American plan, dividing the occupied zones from its eastern share, making possible the development of a new Germanic state. The American proposition of withdrawing from Europe and the Cold War made the European nations to realize how feeble their defense towards the conflicts that were rising was. This fact made them seek for American support, which in turn led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949, uniting the US with Western European.

The American interference and the Marshall Plan made the Monnet Plan useless and therefore a shift in France foreign policy was necessary, but even as the cold war escalates, France main security concern still was Germany. The US engaged in the next several years in a successful attempt to change the French foreign policy in order to make it more inclined towards regional integration. The French answer was a change in its policy, making a double sided policy, in which on one side it would abandon its coercive policy towards Germany in favor of a regional planning, political cooperation and economic integration, on the other side it had asked to the

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

US for a military guarantee in case of a German aggression. These compromises made possible to France to reduce its aggressiveness towards Germany and to begin a regional integration. The European countries, perceiving themselves increasingly vulnerable and with the hegemonic power retreating from Europe as it was involved in several other conflicts worldwide, plus a fear of communist movements spread throughout the continent, the solution envisioned by them was the integration and the acceptance of Germany as an independent state. Aiming to supervision by the German development, the reckless France appealed supranationality forming the ECSC and other European communities.

1.3. PROMOTION, SUPPORT OR HINDERING: PROMOTION AS A MEAN TO ASCENSION

The European integration and recovery had a great influence of the United States and the Cold War conflicts. With its greatest countries in a wreck, it's infrastructure heavily damaged, and the industries transformed by the war efforts, Europe had little hope of recovering alone. Perceiving this, the US policymakers devised a plan to reconstruct Europe. The greatest threat to this plan was the French-German rivalry which could jeopardize the whole process. The American plan was to create a single market that could boost American economy by being an importer and exporter of goods and services to Europe. In order to obtain this, the US tried to use the it's influence in UK to lead the process, but, as already discussed, UK wasn't too eager to begin a process of integration, being more interest in its own recovery. The US began to implement the Marshall Plan, in which one of the demands was that the European countries would administrate the division of the financial aid. Layne (2006) states that the US has supported the European integration process step by step, from the European Payments Union to the single market, for strategic and economic reasons. In truth the US has done more than supported the beginning of European integration, it has promoted it. Throughout a series of policy and financial support, the US has managed to create a new state that would reduce France insecurity making possible to change its foreign policy towards one that would be more European. Gradually, the supported Western European economies, recovers their administrative institutions, defined their sartorial policies and the civil society retrieved their routine activities and industrial activities.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

After the first push, the US became a fierce supporter for the European integration, mainly because its fears that if integration fails, the nationalism could rise yet again and give way to communism in Europe. The US saw integration of Europe and the recovery of Germany as necessary means to achieve stability in the continent, and made great efforts to help the its recovery. The Marshall Plan, the Truman Doctrine and the separation of Germany were examples of US policy towards European reconstruction, as well as necessary steps to ensure the American interests.

The promotion of a regional scheme that would unite the Western Europe, and with close ties to US, was an important step in ensuring the ascension of the US as a hegemonic power, without the need to trouble itself with old rivalries that could disturb the upcoming world order established in 1945, aiding allies to achieve a economy and political stability in order to assist in US claim as undisputed leader of the Western world. So, in other words, the US promoted the integration in Europe throughout a series of policies and financial aid during the 1940's and 1950's.

1.4. HOW EUROPEAN UNION SEES AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE PAST AND NOW

The European Communities has had close ties with the United States since its creation, but this does not means that it has always agreed with the North American policy. At the beginning, and throughout most of the Cold War conflicts, most of the times, when it came in sensible subjects like communism and defense, the views from the European Communities and the Americans were aligned. But in several times they digressed. This was the case of the famous French challenge to the entrance of the UK, in a clear fear of the close ties between Washington and London. As a protest, the French President, Charles De Gaulle, withdrew from the council, leaving his chair empty. This episode was known as the empty chair crisis, through which marked that France didn't desired Washington's influence in the European Communities.

Despite the European Communities and the US had too many similar questions and points of view, from the 1960's to 1970's the European Communities tried to gain a greater freedom, by loosening their ties with Washington, which were made by the French-German Treaty, in order to create a more "European" Europe. This was a clear change in the European's view on American interests. Moreover, since the end of 1960's speculative attacks on dollar led to its

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

overvaluation *vis-à-vis* other currencies. This was a signal that the International Monetary System established in Bretton Woods could be broken by the US at any time. Therefore, the European Economic Community realized that it should find their own solution for the common exchange rates system. So that was what they did when they launched the Werner Plan¹³ in 1970, which established the basis for a deeper integration through macroeconomic policies and a disciplinary control over the exchange rates of the European States. The boom of exports, especially from Germany, the geopolitical stability and the deeper economic integration turned the European Economic Community in a US competitor in economic terms although in geopolitical sphere it continued to be under the US umbrella, even if in some sectors the North-American capital enjoyed all the opportunities investing in German. Therefore, there was a promotion and supporting up US starting to deal with economic and geopolitical problems since the end of the Second World War. From this time on the US was a hinder for the European integration process. On one hand, for the US interests, Western Europe still had its important role as an ally in the Cold War, but, on the other, its economic raising became a stumbling block to the US. The aim to recover from the 1970's economic crisis was the absolute main that made the US take unilateral choices as the end of the fix currency rate dollar-gold. Even with a loose relationship with Washington, there were many themes, especially economic, that the views from the European Communities and US aligned. This is the case of the partnership on the GATT/WTO, which led to the formation of the *Quad* Group¹⁴ and the conclusion of the Letter of Marrakech in which helped with the denouement of the Uruguay Round, by agreeing in several themes including agriculture.

On the commercial area, the US and the European Union are natural allies by being both industrialized countries highly developed. Their views most of the times aligned and they tend to seek each other in order to close the deals. This cooperation reached a point that it was stated that no agreement on the GATT/WTO sphere could pass without their support and that the negotiations happened between themselves and after they had reached out an agreement, the other countries were invited to join in. This logic prevailed up to the Doha Round.

After 9/11 terrorists attacks, the US reaction of invading Iraq and Afghanistan separated the support of European countries. The UK, Spain and Italy supported the invasion and even

¹³ Pierre Werner (1913 – 2002): although he was born in France, he was a Luxemburg citizen. He was also Minister of Finance and Culture and was twice the Prime Minister of Luxemburg.

¹⁴ The *Quad* group was formed by US, European Communities, Canada and Japan.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

helped by sending troops to the field. Meanwhile France and Germany, among others, repudiated the invasions.

The US interests are seen both as opportunities and as threats to the European Union, dividing the countries in order to support or not. Since the 2008 economic crisis, the European Union and the US have had their economic interest aligned, as a way to recuperate their lost economic power. Recently the US and European Union has engaged on talks to an agreement on trade, in order to recover their economies.

2. ASEAN

2.1. ASEAN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

On August 1967 the Declaration of Bangkok created the Association of Southeast Asian Nations signed by five countries: Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore. Despite the attempt to include other countries in the founding of ASEAN, Cambodia and Burma (or Myanmar) refused to join the group (TURNBULL, 1999)¹⁵. And although the association wasn't theoretically anti-Communist and the Declaration's emphasis was on promoting the region cultural and economically (McDOUGALL, 2007)¹⁶, the membership wasn't extended either to South or North Vietnam due to the Vietnam War.¹⁷

The ASEAN member states had, at the time of its creation, very similar political design as countries. They were anticommunists – although not seeking to transmit it as an inner condition to be an ASEAN member – and they gathered driven by the fear of an aggressive and imperialistic reaction from North Vietnam and Communist China to the region; they had governments with relatively open economies, but tending to authoritarianism; and they sought above all to promote and expand trade within ASEAN and outside the region as a tactic to develop individual countries and the region as a whole (TURNBULL, 1999).

The end of the Cold War brought a new boost to ASEAN. “At the same time, changes associated with the end of the Cold War [...] had divided Southeast Asia, it also insulated Southeast Asia as

¹⁵ TURNBULL, Constance Mary. Regionalism and Nationalism. In: TARLING, Nicholas (Eds.). **The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: From World War II to the present**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

¹⁶ McDOUGALL, Derek. **Asia Pacific in World Politics**. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007.

¹⁷ This was the moment of the establishment of two main conditions for membership in ASEAN, articulated by the Philippines Minister of Foreign Affairs: to be a state in Southeast Asia; and to be in conform with the principles and purposes of ASEAN (BA, 2009) -something that was not, at the time, guaranteed by Vietnam.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

a region in key ways.” (BA, 2009:101)¹⁸. With the end of ideological struggle, and the emergence of the U.S. as the new absolute super power, the association could focus on other objectives than on defense and sovereignty of its member states against the communist threat. It was also during the 1990s that ASEAN has increased its scope by horizontal expansion throughout the decade. The region of East Asia experienced a time of great economic growth and rapid industrialization that began about a decade after the end of World War II, but reached its peak in the late 1980s and early 1990s with Japan and the Asian Tigers¹⁹. The bloc insertion in the good economic moment of Asia began in the 1980s, but it was after 1990 that became clear that the association started to seek new goals, while maintaining the same principles of the moment of it was created and shaped.

After the entry of Brunei on the bloc in 1984, ASEAN has opened up to new members from 1995 to 1999, with the desire to actually represent the region of Southeast Asia. Vietnam was, in 1995, the first country to join the ASEAN in the post Cold War, which finally could fulfill the ASEAN's creators desire of the original ASEAN' purpose that was to create an organization that would include minimally Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam (TURNBULL, 1999). Two years later, in 1997, Laos and Myanmar also joined the bloc and in 1999 its latest member was added, Cambodia, equally important to the concept of Southeast Asia that the organization sought to create, but by going through a Civil War over a decade, was still recovering in the early 1990s.

Today, ASEAN is engaged in a structural outspread, that is, ASEAN Plus Three (APT) that aims deepen the bloc relations in trade, economics, political and cultural basis with China, Japan and South Korea each in a different ASEAN Plus One context. This new scheme began to its actual shape after the Asian Crisis of 1997 in which several ASEAN members had to deal with currency, economic and financial problems, and could count basically on Northeast Asian Powers (Japan, China and South Korea) because the western powers as United States were taking actions that weren't seeming helpful for these countries' economies. The Chiang Mai Initiative aided ASEAN countries passing through the crisis and also gave China and Japan a

¹⁸ BA, Alice. **[Re]Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of South East Asian Nations**. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.

¹⁹ The Asian Tigers are: South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and Hong Kong.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

way to show Southeast Asia that they could be responsible leadership for the region (GILL & GREEN, 2009)²⁰.

ASEAN is also the core of other spinoff groups like ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) that deals with security matters and East Asia Summit (EAS) that was supposed to be a more embracing group in political, security, economic, cultural, trade and financial matters exclusive to East Asia but that changed its purpose after the entry of other non East Asian countries as Australia, India and New Zealand and more recently Russia and the United States. What is the role of the United States in the regionalization of Southeast Asia since its beginning in the period of Cold War until the present days and how ASEAN countries deal with the U.S. presence in the past and now are this section main subject.

2.2. US POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO ASEAN

On the time of ASEAN's creation and also during the Cold War period, mainly in the end of 1960's, the 1970's and the first years of the 1980's the United States has represented to the new born association a critical stabilizing force as Asia Pacific major power. It has provided security guard, and also economic assistance, investments and a market for products from ASEAN States. But this link to the U.S. has generated dependence from ASEAN countries to U.S. aid and market, turning them vulnerable to any American change in its policy to Asia²¹ (BA, 2009).

With the Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in late 1978, the United States, ASEAN and China found themselves aligned in opposition to Vietnam (supported in this instance by the Soviet Union). The United States supported ASEAN as a grouping of non-communist Southeast Asian states. Among them the U.S. relationships with Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand were the most significant. (McDOUGALL, 2007: 33-34).

²⁰ GILL, Bateas. GREEN, Michael J. Unbundling Asia's New Multilateralism. In: GILL, Bates. GREEN, Michael J. (Eds.). **Asia's New Multilateralism: Corporation, competition, and the Search for Community**. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

²¹ In another extreme, countries as Indonesia – in the 1960's after the Bandung Conference– didn't want to have that close relationship with U.S. and during the discussion of the Bangkok Declaration was contrary to a clause that would allow temporary bases for U.S. Navy in ASEAN embryo. By the end of the 1970's Indonesia started to ease its relations with the U.S.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

With the end of the war in Vietnam, some ASEAN countries as Thailand and the Philippines who had been supportive to the U.S. presence in war, started to becoming concerned about Vietnamese reaction, and started to rethink external guarantees, mainly U.S. guarantees (BA, 2009). Although supportive to the multilateral ASEAN initiative in the beginning, as a way to keep strategic Asian pieces away from the communist side of the ideological dispute, the U.S. had already a scheme of bilateral partnership in security matters to Asia that was working fairly well.

To reach the three main objectives the U.S. has historically have in East Asia (prevent an hostile state to become regional hegemon; maintain high influence and power projection; and promote political stability and democratic principles) the United States created a system of bilateral alliances during the Cold War. The so called system of San Francisco²², a framework of hub-and-spoke where the U.S. was the hub and the core of each bilateral partnership and the other States were the spoke, all in a security method coalition (PLACEK, 2012).

Although the establishment of the ASEAN in 1967 had been seen as a support to the capitalistic side of the contest, what could have had a positive answer from the U.S. since Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Singapore were trying to reunite as a way of defense face to socialist China and Vietnam, Washington had already had its own plans to create a multilateral security structure – Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) both from 1955 based on an U.S. bilateral security system and dissolved couple of decades later SEATO in 1977 and CENTO in 1979 – without success (COSSA, 2009)²³. Even after the end of those multilateral structures, the U.S. kept the San Francisco System placed sometimes in tension face East and Southeast Asia multilateral settings.

The Asian multilateralism has started to stand out more in U.S. policy and diplomacy to Asia even with organizations that emphasize process over results, not only because those schemes represent Asian political, economical and trade and security matters but also because of the

²² Australia (1951), New Zealand (1951), the Philippines (1951), South Korea (1953), Japan (1954), Thailand (1954), and the Republic of China (1954).

²³ COSSA, Ralph A. *Evolving U.S. Views on Asia's Future Institutional Architecture*. In: GILL, Bates. GREEN, Michael J. (Eds). **Asia's New Multilateralism: Corporation, competition, and the Search for Community**. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

issues this new configuration could arise (SUTTER, 2008)²⁴. Just before the end of the Cold War, the U.S. saw the idea of an ‘institutionalized’ East Asia first in security and then in financial, economic and trade matters with suspicion and apprehension. Because of the changes in East and Southeast Asia multilateralism and the American concern of a future Asian independence of U.S. support in public goods, of a regional power that could replace U.S. role in East Asia and maybe also in Asia Pacific, Washington was trying to regain its space before Asian Financial Crisis – when the region was left aside – in the region.

2.3. PROMOTION, SUPPORT OR HINDERING: FROM SUPPORT TO HINDERING

As ASEAN was evolving and changing its characteristics of just a group who focuses on security topics to an association with a wider table of content with trade and economics as some of its main issues, the U.S. decided to shift its attitudes toward Asia and the support to multilateral schemes on East Asia. It started with the establishment of Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989 as an informal group of Asia Pacific Nations that had the intention of development to reach an economic cooperation level. APEC was also a way to keep U.S. presence in East Asian region and to be a counterpart of ASEAN, a group exclusively of Southeast Asian countries (GILL & GREEN, 2009). Half a decade later, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) was also created, born from an Australian and Japanese purpose. The idea of ARF had to deal with an initial disagreement from the U.S. worried about its bilateral security alliances system for Asia. The ARF was, and it still is, a multilateral forum to discuss security matters in the basis of ASEAN plus others participants states²⁵, but with ASEAN as its core member. This arrangement at first displeased the U.S. who feared that it could interfere on American security system effective to Asia. It took time to convince the U.S. that the ARF, although multilateral and with ASEAN as core member, wouldn’t limit Washington’s freedom to act in the Pacific, in special regarding U.S. Navy (SHERIDAN, 2009).

²⁴ SUTTER, Robert. The United States in Asia: Challenged but Durable Leadership. In: SHAMBAUGH, David YAHUDA, Michael (Eds.) **International Relations of Asia**. Plymouth: Rowman Littlefield, 2008.

²⁵ Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, European Union, India, Indonesia, Japan, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Timor-Leste, United States, and Viet Nam.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

www.revistaintellector.cenagri.org.br

The George W. Bush administration made it very clear that it prefers the more inclusive trans-Pacific format to the narrower Asian regionalism; the former involves the United States as an active player, whereas the U.S. role in the latter remains unclear and is subject to caveats that Washington views with suspicion (COSSA, 2009, p. 33-34).

After the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the U.S., a central actor in the Asia Pacific region, seemingly to abdicate to some leadership responsibilities, what opened space to other leadership dispute with the creation of APT and with Japanese and Chinese investees in the region (GILL&GREEN, 2009). Increasingly, the U.S. saw the more exclusively East Asian initiatives as APT, an well established scheme, and EAS, a newly and more passable of changes group, with distrust and apprehension because the wide Asia Pacific regional groups that included Washington were fading away and getting weaker while the 'asianization' of the East were consolidating based on trade and loose alliances.

In 2011 the U.S. has finally interrupted the East Asia exclusivity inside EAS and together with Russia, became members of a East Asian summit decreasing their concerns about the possibility of a leader in EAS become a leadership in East Asia diminishing the American role in the region. The U.S. is trying to regain its former position in East Asia, left out for more than a decade when the attentions and resources were facing the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. After the end of the wars, Washington is replacing its Navy forces into Australian bases as an attempt to stop 'sphere of influence in the Pacific region' that could be extended to the west and put the American role in danger (WALT, 2011).

The relationship between ASEAN and U.S. hasn't always been turbulent. Although it is possible to classify the American action toward ASEAN in its beginning as supportive in trade and also in security issues based on an ideological perspective, with the ending of the Cold War the U.S. actions facing ASEAN can be considered as 'hindering'. If the ASEAN's initial purpose of an anti-communist Southeast Asian group has evolved to an association deeper and extensive that can deal with trade, economic and cultural matters, the American response to this new framework has also changed. On the turning of the 1980's to the 1990's when there was an initiative to the establishment of the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) to put together the ASEAN member states and the countries of Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) with Japan as

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

leadership, the U.S. has created APEC as a way to oppose the raising multilateralism ASEAN was involved. The ARF creation was also an attempt to keep controlling the Asian security schemes, even with the San Francisco System still operant.

The lack of U.S. support to the East and Southeast Asian multilateral schemes that do not count with American presence is also a proof of the shift in American posture toward ASEAN. If in ASEAN start there were signs of U.S. support, nowadays the signs are of 'hindering' of each and any multilateral scheme Washington is not invited to take part. An example of that is the U.S. presence in the EAS, a summit initially exclusive for East Asian countries whose proposal was to deepen the integration between those countries and with the ASEAN as its core. As Washington was not part of any East Asia integration scheme (only ASEAN spinoffs as ARF and Asia Pacific groups), the EAS wider configuration supported by Japan, South Korea and other U.S. partners, including India, New Zealand and Australia – as a way to counterweight China – received open U.S. support, mainly because it had already established in 2005 a Nuclear Partnership with India and was getting closer to Australia and New Zealand again and also because it was interesting to have a balance weight to China.

After the establishment of this EAS broad version, it got easy for Washington to also be part of this scheme. If the U.S. has managed to become part of the most promising scheme of East Asian integration it maybe has strengthen the ASEAN scheme and may continue left aside of real East and Southeast Asian multilateral schemes. Being part of EAS can mean to the U.S. not only a way of controlling the rise of a new regional and even a world power, but also a mode to hinder a deeper regional integration in East Asia. As EAS is a new scheme in East Asia, and the U.S. entry has occurred in 2011, it is still too soon to allege what will be the American actions inside the bloc.

The U.S. relationship with ASEAN has changed through time. In its beginning, the ASEAN scope was benign to the American interests on the struggle against the communism. The association was kind of a stronghold for capitalism in Southeast Asia that was so close to China and North Vietnam. With the end of the Cold War, ASEAN acquired a new dynamics of search for development, economic and trade expansion and regionalization of the East Asia. The new ASEAN dynamics – that doesn't include the U.S. as a mandatory actor in all its projects – doesn't fit U.S. strategy to the region anymore, a strategy that predicts the system of alliances and one type of dependency and disciplinarily that doesn't match the present ASEAN moment.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

That's why a seat in EAS is so important to U.S. strategy toward the integrated Southeast and East Asia.

2.4. HOW ASEAN SEES AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE PAST AND NOW

The governments of Southeast Asian countries, those who form ASEAN and also the others that are not yet part of this arrangement see the relationship and the role of U.S. in the region with ambivalence. Due to the bilateral alliance system of San Francisco, the U.S. has always seen the multilateralism in Asia less needy than in Europe for example, because its partnership system worked and keep working in a good way since the beginning of the Cold War. However, since the 1990's Washington is preferring an ad hoc multilateralism with a limited number of actors, the most relevant actors in the region (ACHARYA,2009).

For the Southeast Asian countries, more specifically the ASEAN members, the narrow American interest and engagement to long term regional institutions generates a mix of reactions. On the one hand it is profitable for the lesser powers that don't want the dominance, in regional integration matters, of an actor as powerful as the U.S. For another hand without U.S. support, some Asian organizations lack of resources and credibility. The most difficult action for the Southeast Asian countries is to dose the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia integration objectives as community building and trade matters. It is important to have the U.S. near, supporting the multilateralism attempts but not too near to be part of it, as it is in the new EAS setting.

There has always been a strain regarding U.S. bilateral security alliances and East Asia schemes of multilateralism, but after the Cold War it has weakened once Soviet military bases were removed from Southeast Asian countries as the Vietnam. The U.S. bilateral alliances and the multilateralism led by ASEAN can co-exist since they are not opposed to each other and also because the U.S. is trying to use its bilateral partnerships as multilateral bases for security matters (Ibid.).

Although it could work, security is always a delicate issue to deal in Asia, even more with ASEAN principles of not handling security matters inside the bloc. For so, there will always be a mix of support and 'hindering' of U.S. interests in multilateralism in East Asia. The support that occurred in the moment of ASEAN creation in a particular moment during tough Cold War times "as the provider of security and economic goods" (BA, 2009, p. 25) turned to a 'hindering'

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

when comes to the continuing support for multilateralism in East Asia. Several times the U.S. have tried to detain all attempt to an exclusive East Asian multilateralism since East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) – when the U.S. hindered the Malaysian requests for a Japanese leadership in the bloc – passing through ASEAN – ARF created to bind ASEAN, the region security matters and the U.S. – to EAS – that now has the U.S. as an member state that can also be considered a hindering to the willing to create a group exclusively for East Asian States. When the U.S. appeared to abdicate of its main power duties during the Asian Financial Crises, new schemes, as APT, begun to emerge. The U.S. is still a central actor in the Asia-Pacific region providing international public goods and responding to international crises that show up in the region (GILL & GREEN, 2009). The question is if the regional powers will be able to provide the public goods the U.S. still provide to the region. The next movements regarding multilateralism in the region will define if the East Asia could arise above the Asia-Pacific notion or if the power of the U.S. will keep its presence around the idea of regionalizing the East for the Asian countries. Those coming steps will also determine how ASEAN will deal with the U.S.: as a supportive major power, as a ‘saboteur’ major power, or as an important actor but less power to interfere in ASEAN future.

3. MERCOSUR

3.1. MERCOSUR HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The first attempts of integration in Latin America occurred during the 1960s, with the creation of the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), which later, in the 1980s was relaunched as Latin American Integration Association (ALADI, acronym in Portuguese). LAFTA was integrated by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay. Later in the 1970’s, Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela also joined. Then, in 1980 ALADI was created giving continuity to the process of trade integration initiated with LAFTA²⁶. Inspired by the thought of ECLAC (United Nations Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean), integration schemes were formulated with the idea that trade was a dynamic element for development and that the difficulties that the continent faced at that time would

²⁶ Cuba also joined ALADI in 1999.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

only be overcome through a process of import substitution on a regional scale (CAMARGO, 1993: 5)²⁷. Therefore, during the 1950's and 1960's ECLAC became the intellectual support of the import substitution and the regional integration in the region as a strategy to promote the economic development of the periphery countries. They understood that better works of the markets demanded reforms in the society, which should be necessarily headed by the state. The state should promote the industrialization process, a necessary condition for them to leave this peripheral condition, as well as protect the market against the imports.

Unfortunately, LAFTA was not successful due to its problems caused by the market failures and the incompatibility of the economies in the integration process, once they were more competitive than complementary to one another. Moreover, the revolution movements, the contestation and the answer of the conservative sectors during the 1960's and 1970's, which promoted military dictatorship in almost the whole continent, were the main obstacles to the ALALC and ALADI to succeed. Each country had its own reasons for not agreeing to liberalize goods regarding the gradual tariff elimination.

Only near the end of the Cold War, the scenario started to offer more incentives for broader and more effective trade integration in the South Cone. Wyatt-Walter (1995)²⁸ argues that among other factors, the end of the Cold War, which allowed for separation of the issues of security and economics as well as the failure of import substitution policies, led developing countries to search for other ways of participation in the global economy. It was in the light of such phenomena that Mercosur was created (WYATT- WALTER, 1995). In one hand, the end of Cold War and the end of bipolarity gave the states, especially from the periphery, more "freedom" to develop their politics including the regional integration. On the other, most of these countries did not have the US support anymore. In the case of the Latin American countries, most of them had a sense of frustration, as long as they had been waiting for US economic support for many decades during the Cold War.

There were also changes in the bilateral and multilateral perceptions by Argentina and Brazil about time to recover from the historical rivalries and disagreements which were turned to disposal for cooperation and dialogues between them from the beginning of the 1980's. So, in

²⁷ CAMARGO, Sônia de. A integração no Cone Sul. Rio de Janeiro, IRI/PUC-Rio (**Textos IRI 13**) Elsevier, 1993.

²⁸ WYATT-WALTER, A. Regionalism, Globalization, and World Economic Order. In: FAWCETT, L.; HURRELL, A. (Orgs.). **Regionalism in World Politics: Organization and International Order**. 4. ed., Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 74-121.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

the first phase, the political aims were in the frontline *vis-à-vis* to the economic ones, since the redemocratization processes in both countries helped its presidents to abandon their nationalist's positions. In 1986, the presidents Raúl Alfonsín from Argentina and José Sarney from Brazil signed the *Declaration of Iguacu*, which marked the launch integration program between Brazil and Argentina, the Economic Cooperation and Integration Program (PICE, acronym in Portuguese), which launched the economic cooperation between them. This protocol contained economic agreements but also military and nuclear topics. Two years later, an Integration and Cooperation Program subscribed by Brazil and Argentina, forecasted cooperation in several sectors and also established a common market in ten years time. PICE provided a push for the constitution of the MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market in Spanish) in 1991, through the *Treaty of Asunción*. The Treaty of Asunción did not result in interstate structures (but Inter-governmental). All the organs were subjected to government authorities from member states and the decision-making was only achieved by mutual agreement. The development of the Southern Cone bloc was positive in the first years, since the political and technical dialogues were proceeding economic interests in a different featuring stance from previous military governments. The intra-Mercosur trade rose significantly in the first ten years and opened windows of opportunity to Uruguay and Paraguay's association.

The Common Market was inaugurated in 1994 by the *Treaty of Ouro Preto* and originally included Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay (BERNAL-MEZA, 2008, p. 155)²⁹. In 2012, Venezuela also became a member and Bolivia is currently pledging to be incorporated to the block. Besides the economic objectives, MERCOSUR was originally formulated to also work as a promoter of the cultural and political integration of South America, leading to the growing of the continents power and independence, although the economic interests were the main core of objectives of the regional integration process.

Indeed, from the second half of the 1980s until the beginning of the 1990s, there was a simultaneous economic, commercial and institutional intra-bloc growth. All member states had important macroeconomic performance. Flows of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Mercosur countries were high, once the structural reforms and privatizations that have marked the opening of their economies in the period opened the doors from capital from

²⁹ BERNAL-MEZA, Raúl. Políticas exteriores comparadas de Argentina e Brasil rumo ao MERCOSUL. **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional** 42 (2), 1999, pp.40-51.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

overseas. Moreover, during this period there was a significant rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil which agreed on several bilateral and sectoral agreements own constitution and consolidation of Mercosur, and afterwards with the accession of Paraguay and Uruguay.

Due to several internal political and macroeconomic problems in the members of the block, the regional integration has not developed the way the governments expected when they idealized MERCOSUR. After a good moment during the 1990's, from the second half of the 1990's, the bloc experienced a downturn and stagnation in commercial and institutional progression. There were several difficulties. The cultural and political integration has not advanced broadly except for few actions and even the economic liberalization only advanced partially. There were also several difficulties of understanding due to the different macroeconomic policies and asymmetries between the economies. The transaction costs in the region remained high due to the precariousness of transportation infrastructure and the integration process could have advanced further if standards had been agreed by governments simpler and more effectively (IEDI, 2011)³⁰.

Furthermore, before a subsequent crisis of the end of the 1990s decade in emerging markets, all member states had negative macroeconomic performance and a significant reversal of the flow of FDI, although asymmetrically. The foreign capital flows from the region went to East Asian countries. There was a setback commercial and institutional paralysis block: the international crisis that affected abruptly countries of Latin America and Brazil, culminating in the Brazilian devaluation of it's currency in 1999 that created a series of negative *spill-overs*, which had more negative repercussions on trade balances and exchange of other countries. The worse were in Argentina, which appear explicitly in a deep crisis since 2000, which resulted in a worsening of relations with Brazil.

3.2. US POLITICAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO MERCOSUR

As discusses above, since its start, MERCOSUR has gone thought a rough path but also had its accomplishments. In the first years of the economic bloc, the intraregional trade increased

³⁰ IEDI. Instituto de Estudos para o desenvolvimento industrial. Brasil, Argentina e o Mercosul. Março, 2011. <http://retaguarda.iedi.org.br/midias/artigos/4d8267eb23a5c97a.pdf>

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

significantly as a result of the regional integration. The stabilization and privatization programs implemented during the 1990s – not the integration process by itself – were the main forces driving the bloc. Therefore, Mercosur was a complementary aspect during a positive period of stabilization, successful end of inflation and growth, the countries were experiencing. That is why the sovereignty aspect, so sensible for those countries, which had had experienced military authoritarianism during the past decades, was not questioned during the first negotiations. Therefore, the institutions maintained the intergovernmental structure since the beginning. On the other hand, the diversity of its members and their macroeconomic problems posed as a barrier for further integration and established a structure of trade in which Brazil was the core exporter of manufacturing to the others and the main economy of the bloc which persisted exporting agricultural goods and commodities to Brazil. In other words, the Mercosur model maintained an asymmetric structure since its beginning and the model was deepened.

With the development of the economic bloc in the southern part of America, the United States became increasingly worried. They were convinced that they were losing ground in the region in the hands of its competitors like the European Union or other Asian countries like Japan or China (DANTAS, pp.144-145). Also, the US saw an increasing importance of the south region. According to Bernal Meza (1998) the MERCOSUR trade was increasing and other countries (first in Chile; soon, Bolivia, then Venezuela and Ecuador) were aiming to join. Since the trade with Latin American countries was growing during the 1990's, there was an increasing perception that the success of their economic agreement proposal, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) would become effective through a NAFTA-Mercosur relationship. The FTAA was an agreement supposed to eliminate or reduce the trade barriers between countries in the totality of the American continent except from Cuba. The negotiations took place from 1994 until 2005, but no agreement was reached during that time. The FTAA was supposed to be an extension of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), a block constituted by Canada, Mexico and the United States, that became effective in 1994. The FTAA didn't go through because no agreement was reached, since many countries like Cuba, Venezuela, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Brazil, Honduras, among others, opposed it. The Brazilian government, as other South American governments, did not see much advantage in being part of FTAA. So they proposed to recuperate the idea developing and promoting

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

ALCSA³¹ (South American Free Trade Agreement, in Portuguese), which would be kind of an extension of MERCOSUR and that constituted an alternative to the creation of the FTAA (BERNAL-MEZA, 1998).

The Brazilian government, as other South American governments, did not see much advantage in being part of FTAA. So they proposed to recuperate the idea developing and promoting ALCSA³² (South American Free Trade Agreement, in Portuguese), which would be kind of an extension of MERCOSUR and that constituted an alternative to the creation of the FTAA (BERNAL-MEZA, 1998). Moreover, since the end of the 1990's and the beginning of 2000's, several left-centre parties elected presidents in South America, which turned the anti-American feeling stronger in the region.

3.3. PROMOTION, SUPPORT OR HINDERING: THE REGIONAL HINDERING

Bernal Meza (1998) believes it is evident that Washington looked to implement a policy to curb the progress of MERCOSUR and simultaneously isolate Brazil in South America. To achieve this goal, the United States tried to make the negotiations for the FTAA as quick as possible, trying to avoid new agreements of other kind becoming effective. They also tried to attract Chile and Argentina to their axis of influence. On the other side, were the centre-left countries, where the cooperation between their governors against the North American presence in South America led to the launch of an Bolivarian Alliance to the Americas in 2004.

Chile was attracted at that moment it decided to adopt a development model close to the one adopted by the "Asian tigers" and wanted to become a privileged axis for finance and commerce in Latin America. To conquer that, they would need the North American endorsement. At the same time, the USA saw Chile as a good example of the neoliberal economic policies that should be followed by its neighbors and wanted to support it.

³¹ ALCSA was the Idea of joining together MERCOSUR, CAN (Andean Community, integrated by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) and Chile. The proposal to create this block was originally made 1993 by the Brazilian president Itamar Franco. Some economic agreements were reached between the two first blocks, but the general idea of the integration did not progress they way the southern governments expected.

³² ALCSA was the Idea of joining together MERCOSUR, CAN (Andean Community, integrated by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) and Chile. The proposal to create this block was originally made 1993 by the Brazilian president Itamar Franco. Some economic agreements were reached between the two first blocks, but the general idea of the integration did not progress they way the southern governments expected.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

Argentina, for its part, also wanted a special relationship with the United States. They believed that by being close to great powers and accepting the economic and political rules imposed by them, Argentina would gain power and influence in the world. So they implemented an economic policy of unilateral opening, deregulation, privatization, decline of the state and the absence of any control on capital and foreign direct investments.

In different ways, the US tried to disable new sub-regional political cooperation initiatives between Brazil, Argentina and Chile, using their security policies as instruments to divide and break the ties between those three countries. As an example of such an act they stopped the blocking of arms sales for Latin America, therefore generating fear of an arms race in the region.

Several authors, like Bernal Meza (1998), see the attempt of the United States to push the negotiations for the FTAA as quick as possible as an attitude to hindering MERCOSUR. If they could ensure that the FTAA was implemented before the southern bloc they could be sure not to lose ground for any regional arrangements between the countries of the region. Also, they were trying to preserve their interests in the Southern cone, so the less organized the South Americans were, the better for the USA, because they could penetrate more economically and politically in the continent.

Not only the United States did not support regional integration but it did everything in its power to attract strong countries like Argentina and Chile to their axis of influence, therefore weakening the group lead by Brazil. If they could weaken the block economically and politically, then they would have more space to ensure their interests in each of the South American countries. These US interests weren't only political, but also certainly much more economic, that means, opportunities for the North American capital in a region which offered many prospective business.

In conclusion, the United States has never supported or promoted the economic and political integration in South America. On the contrary, they have tried to hindering it whenever they could especially since the second half of the 1990's. Since regional integration has always been seen as not beneficial to the North American economy, they had to curb it as much as they could, by creating other arrangements like it was FTAA that could overlap other regional arrangements or just by attracting some southern countries to their axis of influence weakening MERCOSUR.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

3.4. HOW MERCOSUR SEES AMERICAN INTERESTS IN THE PAST AND NOW

For some authors, MERCOSUR was conceived as an instrument of political détente between the two biggest countries in the region (Brazil and Argentina), but it would also generate initiatives for cooperation beyond the economic-commercial spheres (GONÇALVES and LYRIO, 2003, pp.15). Therefore, the perception that some regional actors were aspiring to achieve greater political influence in the world (especially Brazil), would lead to increasing autonomy of those countries and of the South American continent as a whole.

Gonçalves (1999, pp.3)³³ states that the North American government was worried about the expressive increase in the trade between China and Latin America and also about the agreement that had been signed between the European Union and that same continent, the inter-regional agreements and also bilateral agreements, which has been part of the European strategy to the region since the end of the 1990s. They believed that an agreement as the FTAA, besides its economical benefits, could also be used as a mechanism for conflict resolution in the region. These strategy was preferential than to focus on more progressive negotiation in the International Trade Organization, where both the US and EU maintained their position of protecting their markets.

In the perspective of the developing countries in the Western Hemisphere, the main motivation for the FTAA was the elimination of US trade restrictions (mainly tariffs and also other non-tariff barriers) and having preferential access to the huge North American market, as well as benefit from any foreign investment that flows from US companies. For the American government the main motivations were the expansion of export opportunities and business in the Southern hemisphere of the continent and naturally the consolidation of United States influence in the area. In fact, at that time, the western hemisphere absorbed about 40% of US exports.

According to Bernal Meza (1999, pp. 2008), the Brazilian point of view was that the project of FTAA was proposed by the United States as way to increase its influence in the region.

³³ GONÇALVES, José Botafogo. Lyrio, M.C. Aliança estratégica entre Brasil e Argentina: antecedentes, estado atual e perspectivas. **Dossiê Cebri**, vol.2, ano 2. Rio de Janeiro, 2003.

<http://www.cebri.com.br/midia/documentos/aliancaestrategica.pdf>.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

Therefore they saw the consolidation of that agreement as a problem for its projects of regional leadership. Argentina, on the other hand, was not much against the formation of the block and saw MERCOSUR as one step closer to the conclusion of the trade agreement between the whole of the American continent.

Furthermore, the conditions under which the FTAA was going to be developed were believed by Brazil to be not really advantageous. Even though the trade barriers were going to decrease, the biggest problem for the Brazilian and other South American economies were the non nontariff barriers, like antidumping measures, quotas or subsidies to certain industries. That way, the most probable scenario is that the developing countries of the south hemisphere would not be able to compete with the North American products and would end up losing market shares.

In sum, most of South American countries do not see the United States as an ally of the political and economical integration in their region mainly because it seems no to be in the North American interest. First of all, the USA never truly collaborated to solve the political matters in South America and bolster integration in the region. When they saw their influence reducing because of the increase of trade between the countries of MERCOSUR and also because of the greater relationship of the South American countries with Asia or Europe they tried to propose an agreement (FTAA) that would allow them to keep their status quo of political and economic influence.

The FTAA would have been a great opportunity to further enter the markets of Latin America countries without suffering most of the disadvantages of opening your market because their non tariff barriers made it difficult to the other countries to enter the North American market. Their idea of agreement did not go through, but at the same time MERCOSUR did not progress in the way its members expected and the regional integration in the south cone is still very limited. Then, the USA should not have to worry that much about losing ground in South America because of their integration schemes.

More recently, South America has lost importance in the North American priorities. According to the political scientist Leslie Wehner, from the Institute for Latin American Studies of Hamburg (GIGA), the increasing approximation with China, Russia or Iran are not seen as a menace to the USA, because it seems their economic influence has not been translated into political influence in the southern continent. The United States is therefore prioritizing their

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

security interests in the Caribbean and putting Latin America as a secondary concern. In this way, the USA continues not to act towards the promotion or support Latin American integration and searches reach economic agreements individually with every country (LIMA, 2011).

CONCLUSIONS

As long as we could understand throughout the historical and analytical discussion presented about the role of the US in the three different regional integration processes (EU, ASEAN and Mercosur), in all of them the North American presence is felt in some manner in some extent in an specific period since all the processes were developed under the time of US hegemony in the international system.

Concerning the European integration process, whose first ideas of cooperation between the European states were launched in a context of difficulties and necessity of recovery just after the Second World War, in East Asia there was a predominance of geopolitical interests vis-à-vis economic interests. That is why we understand that the US had acted as a political and economic promoter in the beginning of the European integration process injecting money, promoting cooperation and political dialogue between the rival European States. Europe, in turn, had to accept this financial support to start a process which demands money for reconstruction and social and economic recovery. During the two following decades, the US had acted as a supporter due to geopolitical and economic interests in facing the communism and finding the best opportunities to US capital. Although this role was maintained until the 1970's –when the economic crisis broken on that decade and the negative spill over were felt by the North American economy – there was a change in the focus of the US in terms of cooperation with the EU, as long as the economic cooperation with Europe was not a priority to the US and the North American capital interests should be supported by all means.

Besides this fact, Western Europe continued to be a geostrategic area for the US, where many military basis were maintained, even after the end of the Cold War. What we could also see is that after a new stimulus to deeper the European economic integration in the middle of the 1980's, US did not support or promote it in the same manner since then. An economic and political support persists, but not in the same means as in the past, since the end of the USSR

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

turned the geopolitical scenario in a different one. Moreover, high importance positions at the biggest political and economic institutions and forums, the EU and US also were not so aligned as they used to be, as we could see in the invasion of Iraqi and Afghanistan, also mentioned. For this reason, US can be seen as a hinder to some European Union's decisions and opinions, although not a stumbling block to a deeper integration.

The relationship between the U.S. and ASEAN has also developed in the context of the Cold War and due to security purposes, the US supported the born of ASEAN in the 1960's, not only politically – providing security guard - but also economically by investments and economic assistance. After serving as a geopolitical instrument to the U.S. in the region of Southeast Asia during the ideological dispute and with the end of the Cold War, ASEAN has evolved and changed its objectives in a way that didn't fit the U.S. strategy to the region anymore. This change in the ASEAN added with the growing establishment of regional schemes for Asians and not for the Asia Pacific, has disturbed the American movements to the East Asia as a role, once those schemes didn't included the U.S. Recently with the EAS creation, the U.S. tried to increase its presence inside those Asian blocs, not only sponsoring the group extension (in members numbers) with India and Australia, but also adhering the group itself. It is a way of hindering the regionalization of East and Southeast Asia, but it also can be seen as an attempt to control the Chinese actions toward the region from inside. That's way it is possible to say the U.S. actions to Southeast Asian regionalization has passed from a support to a hindering, that is also related to leadership issues.

Regarding Mercosur, as we could see, the US did not have a direct role in the first negotiations and the formation of this bloc. Therefore, there was not a support neither a promotion by the US in the beginning of the South Cone integration process. During the second half of the 1980's, the aim of Argentina and Brazil in starting more friendship relations, and afterwards Uruguay and Paraguay ascension to the cooperation group , all seeking to complement their economic and reform openness in order to optimize the capital opportunities, alerted the U.S. The political dialogue and cooperation in the security field was not the main purpose of the members. Since there were potential and great economic opportunities in this region, the US launched the project to extend the NAFTA to the whole Americas forming the FTAA, but did not promote or support Mercosur. Moreover, acting as a pressure to form FTAA, we see that the US have tried to hinder the deepening of the South Cone regional integration process in order to

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

maintain their status quo of political and economic influence. If FTAA would be agreed, certainly Mercosur would be disintegrated, since its legislation does not allowed this kind of cooperation neither it would make sense a cooperation between Southern Cone states to exist.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

ACHARYA, Amitav. The strong in the world of the weak: Southeast Asia in Asia's Regional Architecture. GREEN, Michael J. GILL, Bates (Eds.). **Asia's New Multilateralism: Corporation, Competition, and the Search for Community**. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

ALDRICH, Richard J. **CIA and European unity: The American committee on United Europe**. Available at: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/people/aldrich/publications/oss_cia_united_europe_eec_eu.pdf

AMORIM, Wellington. COELHO, Carlos Frederico. **Trade Integration: ASEAN and Mercosur in a Comparative Perspective**. Article presented in International Studies Association (ISA) Convention em Nova Orleans, EUA. February, 2010.

ARRIGHI, Giovanni. **O Longo Século XX: dinheiro, poder e as origens de nosso tempo**. Rio de Janeiro, Contraponto, 1996.

BA, Alice. **[Re]Negotiating East and Southeast Asia: Region, Regionalism, and the Association of South East Asian Nations**. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009.

BACHE, Ian. GEORGE, Stephen. BULMER, Simon. **Politics in the European Union**. 3ª Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.

BERNAL-MEZA, Raúl. Argentina y Brasil em la Política Internacional: regionalismo y Mercosur (estratégias, cooperación y factores de tensión). **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, 51 (2), 2008.

BERNAL-MEZA, Raúl. Políticas exteriores comparadas de Argentina e Brasil rumo ao MERCOSUL. **Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional**, 42 (2), 1999, pp.40-51.

BHAGWATI, Jagdish. **Termites in the Trading System: How Preferential Trade Agreements Undermine Free Trade**. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.

CAMARGO, Sônia de. A integração no Cone Sul. Rio de Janeiro, IRI/PUC-Rio (**Textos IRI 13**) Elsevier, 1993.

CHURCHILL, Winston. Speech for students in Zurich, 1946 Available at: <<http://www.europa-web.de/europa/02wwwswwww/202histo/churchil.htm>>.

CINI, Michelle, BORRAGÁN, Nieves. **European Union Politics**. 3ª Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

COSSA, Ralph A. Evolving U.S. Views on Asia's Future Institutional Architecture. In: GILL, Bates. GREEN, Michael J. (Eds). **Asia's New Multilateralism: Corporation, competition, and the Search for Community**. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

DANTAS, Alexis Toríbio. Impactos da ALCA nas relações do Brasil com o Mercosul. In: Benecke, Dieter; Nascimento, Renata; Fendt, Roberto. (Eds.). **Brasil na Arquitetura Comercial Global**. 1ª Ed.. Rio de Janeiro: Konrad Adenauer, 2003, v. 1, pp. 135-156.

DEBLOCK, Christian. Hamel, Buno. Bretton Woods et l'ordre économique international d'après-guerre. Un document produit en version numérique par Jean-Marie Tremblay, bénévole. Available at: [http://www.uqac.quebec.ca/zone30/Classiques des sciences sociales/index.html](http://www.uqac.quebec.ca/zone30/Classiques%20des%20sciences%20sociales/index.html).

DINAN Desmond. **The European Integration Process** In: HAY, Colin; MENON, Anand. **European Politics** (eds.). Nova York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

DINAN, Desmond. How did we get here? In: BOMBERG, Elizabeth. et al. **The European Union – How does it work?** 2nd Ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

GILL, Bates. GREEN, Michael J. (Eds.). **Asia's New Multilateralism: Corporation, competition, and the Search for Community**. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

GILL, Bateas. GREEN, Michael J. Unbundling Asia's New Multilateralism. In: GILL, Bates. GREEN, Michael J. (Eds.). **Asia's New Multilateralism: Corporation, competition, and the Search for Community**. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

GOLDSTEIN, Joshua. Long Cycles: **Prosperity and War in the Modern Age**, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1986.

GONÇALVES, José Botafogo. Lyrio, M.C. Aliança estratégica entre Brasil e Argentina: antecedentes, estado atual e perspectivas. **Dossiê Cebri**, vol.2, ano 2. Rio de Janeiro, 2003. Available at: <http://www.cebri.com.br/midia/documentos/aliancaestrategica.pdf>.

GONÇALVES, Reinaldo. ALCA e Mercosul: fatos e visões. Rio de Janeiro: ECEX/UFRJ, Estudos em Comércio Exterior, Vol. II, jul/dez, 1999.

HAY, Colin; MENON, Anand. **European Politics**. Nova York: Oxford University Press, 2007.

HERZ, M.; HOFFMANN, A. R. **Organizações Internacionais: Historia e Prática**. Ed. Campus, Rio de Janeiro, 2004.

KENNEDY, Paul. **Rise and Decline of the Great Powers**. Fontana Press, London, 1989.

KINDLEBERGER, Charles. **The World in Depression 1929-1939**, University of California Press, 1986.

LAYNE, Christopher. **The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present**. New York, Cornell University Press, 2006

Ano IX	Volume IX	Nº 19	Julho/Dezembro 2013	Rio de Janeiro	ISSN 1807-1260
--------	-----------	-------	---------------------	----------------	----------------

LIMA, Rosa Muñoz. América Latina ainda é secundária para os EUA, avaliam especialistas. DW, 26/03/2013. Available at: <http://www.dw.de/am%C3%A9rica-latina-ainda-%C3%A9-secund%C3%A1ria-para-os-eua-avaliam-especialistas/a-14943326>.

McDOUGALL, Derek. **Asia Pacific in World Politics**. Bolder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007

NY Times, March 6, 2013. Europe's Carmakers Look Forward to U.S. Trade Pact. Available at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/07/business/global/europes-carmakers-look-forward-to-us-trade-pact.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>.

PLACEK, Kevin. The San Francisco System: declining relevance or renewed importance? **Australian Institute of International Affairs**. Available at: <http://www.aiaa.asn.au/qa/qa-vol4-issue1/759-the-san-francisco-system-declining-relevance-or-renewed-importance> .

SARAIVA, Miriam Gomes. **Argentina e Brasil frente ao MERCOSUL: desencontros e diferenças de perspectivas**. Rio de Janeiro: IRI-PUC-Rio/CGEE – Radar do Sistema Internacional, agosto/2008.

SHAMBAUGH, David YAHUDA, Michael. **International Relations of Asia**. Plymouth: Rowman, Littlefield, 2008.

SHERIDAN, Greg. Australia's Pragmatic Approach to Asian Regionalism. In: GILL, Bates. GREEN, Michael J. (Eds.). **Asia's New Multilateralism: Corporation, competition, and the Search for Community**. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

SUTTER, Robert. The United States in Asia: Challenged but Durable Leadership. In: SHAMBAUGH, David YAHUDA, Michael. **International Relations of Asia**. Plymouth: Rowman Littlefield, 2008.

TARLING, Nicholas (Org.). **The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: from World War II to the present**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

The Guardian. France and Germany unite against Iraq war. Available at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jan/22/germany.france> 2003.

TURNBULL, Constance Mary. Regionalism and Nationalism. In: TARLING, Nicholas (Eds.). **The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: From World War II to the present**. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

WALT, Stephen, M. Explaining Obama's Asia policy. **Foreign Policy**, 2011 Available at: http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/11/18/explaining_obamas_asia_policy.